# Commonalities and Implications of the Ukrainian War and the 6·25 Korean War

Woo Pyungkyun
(The Academy of Korean Studies)
(woopk@aks.ac.kr)

| Abstract |

The Ukraine war and the 6·25 Korean War represent limited-scale international conflicts of the 21st and 20th centuries, respectively. These two wars share similarities in three aspects. Firstly, the aggressor attempted to justify the war with an argument that lacked validity for the invading party. Secondly, both wars witnessed arbitrary decisions made by non-expert leaders regarding war and military strategy. Dictatorship, as a system, facilitated unreasonable war decisions. Thirdly, the international community rallied to support Ukraine and Korea, recognizing the unfair attempts made to rationalize the invasion wars. Additionally, Russia and North Korea, the initiators of these wars, had already formulated meticulous occupation policies prior to the conflicts, resulting in inhumane acts such as torture, killings, and civilian abductions in the occupied regions. However, the Ukraine war distinguishes itself by being fought on a battlefield that utilized advanced weapons like cyber warfare and drones, owing to the technological advancements and network-centric society of the 21st century, which was not the case in the 6·25 Korean War. Ultimately, the war in Ukraine, stemming from Russia's misguided decision, is likely to have consequences that accelerate the demise of Putin's regime.

**Key Words**: Ukraine War, 6·25 Korean War, Geopolitics, NATO, Cyber War

# Ⅰ. Introduction

As of 5 a.m. on February 24, 2022, Russia initiated a "special military operation" against Ukraine, launching invasions from four directions along a 1,200-kilometer front. Initially, experts predicted an easy victory for Russia; however, Ukraine's resistance and counterattacks prevented Russia from achieving its war objectives, which included capturing Kyiv and replacing the Ukrainian leadership. In late March, Russia shifted its goal to securing a stronghold in the south and the Donbas region. As a result, the Ukraine war has become protracted, and the conflict has grown increasingly complex compared to its early stages. This raises the question of what characteristics distinguish the Ukraine war from the 6 · 25 Korean War, which erupted on the Korean Peninsula on June 25, 1950. While the Ukraine war took place in Europe in the 2020s and the conflict between Ukraine and Russia has distinct temporal and spatial contexts, can we identify any comparable aspects between the two wars, especially when considering the international involvement witnessed during the 6 · 25 Korean War, specifically the war between the United States and China?

The purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons for comparing the Ukraine war and the 6 · 25 Korean War. The two wars were fought in different periods and geographies, but the similarities are strikingly greater than the differences. The commonalities are first, both wars can be seen as representative acts of aggression in Europe and Asia following World War II, with the aim of acquiring territory by invading established borders. The Ukraine war marked the first instance, post-World War II in Europe, of attacking another country's territory through the use of force. Similarly, the 6 · 25 Korean War was the initial large-scale act of aggression in Asia after World War II. Consequently, these two wars can be considered as representative conflicts that disrupted the postwar order.

Secondly, just as these two wars represented acts of aggression in Asia and Europe after World War II, the invaded countries received significant international support. the 6 · 25 Korean War, being the first aggression since the establishment

of the United Nations, witnessed extensive backing from a majority of UN members, including the deployment of UN troops, providing comprehensive support to Korea. Similarly, in the Ukrainian war, international efforts encompassed various forms of assistance for the affected country. Both wars share the common aspect of seeking strong international solidarity for the nations impacted by acts of aggression and their restoration to their pre-conflict state.

Thirdly, these two wars can be compared in terms of their potential to alter the postwar international order. the 6·25 Korean War played a crucial role in solidifying the Cold War division between the East and the West, escalating the existing confrontation. Similarly, the Ukraine war serves as an opportunity to strengthen the confrontational system between the West and emerging revisionist states such as China and Russia in the 21st century. Thus, these wars have the potential to reshape the postwar international order.

Since the 2010s, the Ukraine war has emerged as a conflict that signifies the end of the post-Cold War era, which lasted for over three decades, and signals the onset of a new era characterized by confrontation between different factions. This confrontation involves the United States and the West opposing the combined forces of China and Russia, presenting a distinct dynamic from the 20th-century Cold War. However, the Ukraine war has currently trapped the two camps in a state of conflict, making it difficult to find an immediate resolution. Similarly, the 6·25 Korean War played a pivotal role in the transition from the post-World War II era to the Cold War era. Both wars share the characteristic of ushering in new systems and orders.

Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that as of August 2023, the Ukraine war is still ongoing. Therefore, any predictions regarding the outcome of the postwar period are speculative, and it is premature to make definitive statements about the final consequences of the conflict.

Nevertheless, regardless of the war's outcome, it is possible to define the nature of the conflict based on the characteristics that have emerged during the decision-making and progression of the war. Russian President Putin labeled Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a "special military operation" and attempted to

rationalize the war through two main justifications. The first was Ukraine's perceived deterrence from joining NATO, while the second revolved around the declaration of Ukraine being "demilitarization and denazification" of Ukraine. However, Russia's justifications for the war lacked foundation, and the international community did not recognize them. The Ukrainian war, similar to the 6·25 Korean War, constituted a violation of the provisions of the UN Charter regarding acts of aggression and was an illegal action that contradicted international law. From this perspective, both wars fail to provide a sufficient reason to start a war in terms of the so-called "just war" theory. This paper aims to show why both wars do not qualify as just wars.

The purpose of this paper is to compare the Ukraine war and the 6·25 Korean War with the assumption that there are similarities between them. The focus will be on identifying the commonalities between these two wars, one taking place in the 1950s (Korean War) and the other in the 2020s (Ukraine war). Both wars exhibit characteristics that are representative of conflicts in the 20th century. However, it is important to acknowledge that there are also differences between these two wars, reflecting the evolving aspects of warfare in the 21st century. Through this comparative analysis, the paper aims to highlight the significance of the Ukraine war and the 6·25 Korean War in modern history, ultimately reaching a logical conclusion.

To achieve this objective, Chapter 2 will characterize the Ukrainian and Korean wars based on just war theory and explore their implications. Chapter 3 will compare the similarities and differences between the Ukraine war and the 6·25 Korean War. Chapter 4 will present an outlook on the postwar period. Finally, Chapter 5 will conclude the paper by summarizing the findings and insights gained from the comparative analysis.

# Ⅱ. Just War Theory and the Two Wars

## 1. What is the Just War Theory?

War has been a constant in human history, and people have long reflected on its necessity. While war shouldn't happen, the reality is that it's impossible for it to be completely avoided. Thus, the question of how to recognize and limit war has evolved into the current theory of just war. While Christianity has a long history of attempting to establish a just war theory, the modern just war theory was developed as a result of major conflicts in the 20th century, including the two World Wars and the Vietnam War. Just war theory is a scholarly endeavor that seeks to answer the question, "If war is inevitable, what type of war can be morally justified?" In other words, the central principle is that war can be "justified," and even when it is, there should be limitations. This guiding principle consists of 'jus ad bellum,' the justification for initiating a war, 'jus in bello,' the principles governing conduct during a war, and 'jus post bellum,' the moral considerations after the war (Orend 2000, 117-137; Patterson etc. 2022; Miller 2021).

Greg Janzen identifies five justifications for starting a war in order of importance. 1) just cause 2) irrelevance 3) good intentions 4) legitimate authority 5) last resort (Janzen 2016, 36-37). Other judgment categories include declaration of wart, and hope for victory. The legitimacy of starting a war implies the legitimacy of the war itself, so the reasons and intentions of the war are key issues (Walzer 2006, 44).

First, a war must be initiated by an "authorized actor." It recognizes the legitimacy of wars waged by actors with state sovereignty, i.e., states. Legitimate authority generally recognizes that, except humanitarian intervention, war is publicly declared by the supreme ruler of a sovereign state through due process. When war is waged by non-state actors such as criminal groups or specific guerrilla groups, it violates the principles of just war (Welsh etc. 2002, 489-512).

Second, war must be preceded by a public "declaration of war," which must

be accompanied by a justifiable cause. Here, "just cause" falls under the umbrella of the right of self-defense, which is defined as a defense against aggression, and is an established principle of international law contained in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, violation of which constitutes an unlawful war. Other situations cited as justification include the restoration of territory lost to aggression, intervention to assist in defense, and humanitarian intervention to restore human dignity. It can be pointed out that for a war to be just, there must be a legitimate reason (Roscini 2015, 634-660).

Third, war should be a last resort. War should be the exception, not the rule. When all available means of avoiding war, such as diplomatic negotiations and sanctions, have been exhausted and failed, war may be authorized exceptionally if it meets the aforementioned objectives and intentions (Regan 2013, 88-101).

Fourth, the commencement of the war must enable a "reasonable prospect of victory," meaning that the prospect of victory must be probable because the reason and intent of the war are to undo the peace-destroying acts that led to the war. If there is no prospect of victory, it is wrong to go to war, no matter how justified the cause (Heyden 2005, 157-176).

Even after a war has been fought, a just war theory provides principles for how to conduct it. The legitimacy of waging war is based on the rightness or wrongness of the actions taken by the waging state during the war. Among other things, the Army shouldn't attack civilians who are noncombatants in war, civilian facilities that aren't related to military installations, etc. This is where the principle of proportionality comes into play, which means that military force should only be used to the extent necessary to achieve the objectives of the war. The belligerent state must use the minimum amount of force necessary to restore peace (Williams 2014, 167-180).[4]

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4) Proportionality is a core principle in international law, which provides that the legality of an action shall be determined depending on the respect of the balance between the objective and the means and methods used as well as the consequences of the action. This principle implies an obligation to appreciate the context before deciding on the legality or the illegality of an action. This assessment is the responsibility of those who act. In case of dispute or doubt, tribunals can assess the facts and their legality a posteriori.

The just war theory attempts to regulate not only the initiation and conduct of war but also the post-war situation. The end of a war should be peaceful and should be followed by attempts to secure peace by establishing a lasting peace. This includes building the infrastructure for post-war reconstruction and withdrawing troops in a post-war state of peace. In the case of the war in Ukraine, which is the subject of this paper, the war is still ongoing, but the international debate on post-war reconstruction is beginning, especially in the United States and Europe. Therefore, this paper is limited to discussing the definition of war as it relates to the start of the war.

## 2. Applying the just war theory to two wars: the initiation of war

the 6 · 25 Korean War and Russia's invasion of Ukraine both violated the principles of just war except for the "authorized actor" category, as shown in Table 1.

〈Table 1〉 Compliance with the Principles of just war

| Category | Principle | Ukraine War | Korean War |
|---|---|---|---|
| jus ad bellum | Authoritative actor | ○ | ○ |
| | Declaration of was, just cause | × | × |
| | Resonabke intent | × | × |
| | Last resort | × | × |
| | Hope based on reason | × | × |
| jus in bellum | Proportionality | × | × |
| | Distinction(combatants and non-combatants) | × | × |
| jus post bellum | Post-war recovery | – | – |

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Proportionality is particularly important to balance the argument of military necessity in assessing the legality of the use of armed force. Particularly, it applies in cases of individual or collective self-defense, in cases of recourse to armed force by a State to restore order and public safety in times of internal disturbances, and in situations of international or non-international conflicts (Frontiers 2022).

The Korean and Ukrainian wars violated all of the Just War Principles except for the "authorized actor" category, as shown in Table 1. Russia is a state actor recognized by the international community, has an army, and mobilizes the armed forces of a sovereign state. However, Russia mobilized a private military group called the "Wagner Group" to make up for its "lack of troops," many of whom were recruited largely from prisoners serving time. Russia also sought to avoid the term "war" in President Putin's speech announcing the invasion of Ukraine by calling it a "special military operation" instead of a "war" against Ukraine, which would have made Russia's objectives less than a just war.

The rationale for mobilizing its armed forces and how it deployed them should have followed internationally accepted rules and norms, which Russia blatantly ignored. Russia failed to fulfill both its rationale and justification for the war, as it waged a preventive war as a solution to the unresolved issue of Ukraine's possible NATO membership, and indiscriminately attacked civilians across Ukraine, including in the capital, Kyiv. In the end, Russia's unjustified start to the war and its indiscriminate shelling, abuse of prisoners of war, and abduction of children served as a rallying cry for Ukrainians to stand up to Russia and broadened the international community's sympathies (Ban 2022, 13-14).

the 6·25 Korean War also has none of the aspects of a just war except that it was fought by a state actor, North Korea, with its armed forces. North Korea did not declare war on the South and has consistently claimed that it was the aggressors who started the war and that it was in response to a surprise attack by South Korea and the United States that prompted it to go on the offensive. North Korea, which insists that the 6·25 Korean War was fought with careful preparation and planning by South Korea and the United States, called the 6·25 Korean War a "war of national liberation" and claimed that South Korea was a colony of the United States. North Korea's rationale for the 6·25 Korean War is itself a one-sided argument that does not stand up to scrutiny under the principles of just war because it distorts the facts. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

# Ⅲ. Similarities between the Ukraine war and the 6·25 Korean War: Sharing the inhumane characteristics of the 20th century war

## 1. Lack of a justification for war and supreme leader's ignorance of war

If the Ukraine war was Putin's war, the 6·25 Korean War was Stalin's war. Putin has decided on the war, and the cessation of the war depends on his determination. Since 2021, Russia has concentrated on complete preparations for the invasion, including conducting joint exercises with Belarus while stationing large-scale troops on the border between Ukraine and Russia. In preparing for Russia's attack, the U.S. was the only one to warn the international community of the possibility of attack, calling for preparation for Russia's invasion. Still, most European countries, except Britain, did not believe in the case of Russia's invasion. Based on their standards, there could be no war if they made a reasonable judgment. But Russia, more precisely, Putin aimed at this. He predicted that he would not detect his intention to think on a different basis from the West and was convinced of the possibility of a successful surprise invasion.

Putin issued a public statement on "special military operations" along with the launch of the attack. Through this, he stressed that Russian troops should operate in Ukraine for Ukraine's ban on NATO membership and "non-militarization and de-Naziization." Putin used the term "special military operation" instead of "war" to avoid accusations of committing an invasion war, which is illegal under international law. However, Russia's invasion violates international law and the United Nations Charter, which denies the invasion war. The bombing, slaughter, kidnapping, and rape of civilians by Russian troops in Ukraine after the war broke out are considered war crimes and should be condemned. In addition,

more than 5 million Ukrainians fled their homeland to neighboring countries to save their families from the devastation of the war, and the damage done to Ukraine is hard to express.

For Russia, the demand for a ban on NATO membership of Ukraine and demilitarization forces institutional guarantees of Russia's security by insisting that Ukraine be a buffer zone against Western attacks. However, historically, there have been very few examples of aggressive wars aimed at securing buffer states. It was Stalin who expanded and completed the territory of the modern Soviet Union. Stalin established communist satellite states in Eastern Europe as a buffer zone for the West and the Soviet Union. At the same time, the United States did not care about the Allied advance into Europe at the end of World War II. In other words, like a kind of spoils, Eastern European countries were easily friendly in the postwar process. Therefore, waging war to expand the buffer zone cannot be an appropriate justification (Woo 2022, 189-190).

The fact that the war in Ukraine has no justification is also revealed by the passage of a resolution at the UN General Assembly immediately after the war broke out, condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine and demanding an immediate withdrawal. Quite a few countries could not oppose and abstained in consideration of existing relations with Russia. Still, only five countries, including Russia, favored and opposed to the resolution, including North Korea, Belarus, Syria, and Eritrea.[5]

The world's major powers, including the United States, Britain, and the European Union, have led sanctions against Russia and military aid to Ukraine, voicing criticism of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In particular, the United States held a Ukrainian Defense Liaison Group (UDCG) meeting involving defense officials from 47 countries to donate the shells, coastal defense systems, tanks, and armored vehicles needed by Ukraine and also trained Ukrainian troops. Twenty nations

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5) "General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine," accessed March 2, 2022, General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine, UN News.

worldwide have provided security assistance to Ukraine, including weapons and other military supplies (VOAKOREA 2022). In addition, many countries voluntarily donated cash and relief supplies needed for refugees, even if they did not provide weapons. Japan is one of the leading countries in Asia that supports Ukraine, joining Western-led sanctions on Russia, and deciding to send an additional $100 million following a $100 million donation in the early stages of the war.

The lack of a justification for the war is also related to the views of the supreme leader who finalizes the war. The president, who is the commander-in-chief of the military, should also know national defense. Suppose a president is an outsider in national defense. in this case, he or she should appoint a military expert regardless of position or position as an advisor and seek advice on military matters from time to time. During World War II, President Roosevelt used these systems well (Lee 2010. 570-571).

Putin's background and beliefs paly a unique role in the reasoning behind the war with Ukraine. Putin was the part of the KGB and military training but never saw combat. Evidence suggests that leaders with military and agency backgrounds are more likely to start a war than leaders with military combat experience (Horowitz etc. 2015, 129-134; Titherington 2022). In addition, being apart of such an agency will install certain qualities, beliefs, and behaviors in an individual. One being extreme patriotism and Ultra-nationalism. Nationalism is the most dominant layer of Putin's identity, which allows us to understand his motivations. part of the KGB's motto was 'loyalty to the motherland.' Putin believes Ukraine is a part of the 'motherland,' and therefore. he is merely taking back Russia's land. He suggested that the existence of an independent Ukraine was incorrect, claiming that Ukraine lacked historical roots and characterizing it as a country created by Lenin and other socialist ideologues' utopian worldview (Titherington 2022).

In August 2021, the Kremlin reviewed the scenario of attacking Japan by provocation on the "Northern Territories" in territorial disputes with Japan, but it was withdrawn in the face of opposition from its aides that it was not profitable.

An internal leak within FSB of its decision to invade Ukraine instead of Japan calls into question about the common sense in an understanding the Kremlin and Putin's war (Brugen 2022). Changing the country to attack according to its convenience raises  whether Russia needs war.

Despite Putin's ignorance of war and military strategy in the Ukrainian war, it is revealed that he tried to command detailed tactics and the goals of military operations. For six weeks after the outbreak of the war, the Russian army made the mistake of overseeing all operations in Moscow without having a field commander in Ukraine. Putin held meetings and gave direct instructions in the Kremlin with the defense minister, the chief of general staff, and the FSB director, and directly reviewed detailed operations and tactics as well as the central crisis of the battlefield. Putin is so directly involved in the war that it is reported that he was reported every hour in the Kremlin in early stage of the war (Arena 2022).

On the other hand, Ukraine was ordered by the president from a significant direction, but the military established and implemented specific military operations. In addition, if it was uncertain whether the operation would succeed, it asked for support from allies such as the U.S. and Britain to establish a military operation. The most representative example is the Ukrainian military's great counterattack in early September 2022 and excellent success in northeastern Ukraine, including Ukraine's restoration of Kharkiu. Knowing that Russia's elite troops were deployed in the south to prepare for Ukraine's attack, the U.S. supported Ukraine in changing its plan to attack Russia in two locations near southern Kherson and eastern Kharkiu instead of concentrating on one front (Pietralunga 2022). Due to the strategic intervention of the West, including the United States, Ukraine's counterattack was a great success, and the Ukrainian military proved its strategic ability to succeed in important military operations.

The 6 · 25 Korean War was also unjust in the cause of war. the 6 · 25 Korean War began as a surprise invasion of the South across the entire dividing line between the two Koreas without a de facto declaration of war. North Korean

leader Kim Il-sung has not officially expressed his rationalization for the war before it began. However, he repeatedly stressed the party's official line that the North should unify the two into communism through official meetings in North Korea. On June 25, 1950, at 1:35 p.m., North Korea announced a declaration of war against South Korea by launching a counterattack as a self-defense measure because South Korea invaded the North (History Museum 2022), In other words, they tried to justify their surprise attack on the South with the logic that South Korea launched an invasion war and North Korea fought back. He tried to cover up the reality of the war of aggression, which he provoked according to a detailed plan in advance, and transferred the responsibility to South Korea.

Korea established the National Assembly through the May 10, 1948 general elections, adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, and launched the government of the Republic of Korea on August 15, that year. As a result, the legitimacy of the South Korean government was recognized by the United Nations in December 1948, while North Korea opposed elections and government established under the jurisdiction of the United Nations and established its government. As a result, the U.N.-recognized representation of the legitimate government was recognized as a war illegally invaded by North Korea, leading to massive support for South Korea at the U.N. level. the 6 · 25 Korean War was the first war of aggression since the founding of the United Nations in 1945, and almost all U.N. members supported the Republic of Korea to counter North Korea's attack against the spirit of the United Nations, which was established to condemn and prevent illegal wars.

The North Korean military's failure in the 6 · 25 Korean War was largely attributed to Kim Il-sung's lack of understanding of the war. Kim Il-sung and his leaders have experienced guerrilla warfare but have made mistakes because they have not experienced the preparation and execution of large-scale wars. Kim Il-sung made a simple war plan and tried to carry it through. Of course, the plan Kim Il-sung set up was implemented with Stalin's approval. In a April 1950 meeting with Stalin, Kim Il-sung suggested that the United States would not intervene

in the war, arguing that the United States had no time to intervene because the war would end within three days (Lee 2010, 597).

In a preliminary simulation with the Soviet Union before the invasion, North Korea planned to end the invasion war in 50 days by Aug. 15. Kim Il-sung planned to break through 90 kilometers to the Han River in five days, break through 140 kilometers in the next two weeks and 80 kilometers in the next 10 days to take over all ports on the south coas (Ministry of Defense 1979, 14-15). He believed that the war could be ended simply by pushing the South Korean military and the U.S. forces that made a hasty landing in a hurry. It is challenging to make such a plan if we know the 'basic' that war is the process of responding to numerous variables. However, it is the height of the simple idea that if he march with the T-34 tanks and various weapons supported by the Soviet Union, he can win. Moreover, it is a plan that does not consider the fact that there is a problem in supply due to the deepening depth of the penetration (Baek 2018, 298-299).

Kim Il-sung came forward at each stage of the operation and determined everything. All the North Korean military's operations at that time were based on Kim Il-sung's decision. It is unfortunate in many ways that a national leader does not understand war. It is unlikely that the war will be won, and even if it  a fluke wins it, it will have great aftereffects. Leaders who have experienced war or military commanders who are familiar with operations struggle to minimize the devastating consequences of war. However, leaders who do not understand war are intoxicated with rapid victory and are insensitive to the resulting sacrifice. It is difficult to make a careful decision, driven by the delusion that the sooner the war ends, the less damage can be. In this regard, Putin, who started the Ukrainian war, and Kim Il-sung, who started the 6 · 25 Korean War, were both non-experts who did not understand the nature of the war. They committed foolish acts that quickly decided a war that would result in many innocent victims.

In the end, an invasion war in which a leader, not an expert in war and

military affairs, arbitrarily decides to kill innocent people in large quantities occurs in autocratic societies such as feudal dynasties, communism, or authoritarian regimes. In a country where very few dictators are masters, aggressive wars are likely to occur in a country where dictators who only enjoy the fruits of war victory have the right to decide. A word from the top leader ignores the public's right to know and will of the people in a system where war breaks out. Putin's war in Ukraine and the 6 · 25 Korean War, pushed by Stalin and Kim Il-sung are typical wars that were started by the dictator's decision.

## 2. Mass support from the international community – Role of proxy wars and deepening of the Cold War

The Ukraine war and the 6 · 25 Korean War are standard because the international community has given fully supported the invaded country.

At the start of the war in Ukraine, Putin was convinced that the West would not be able to readily confront Russia's aggression readily. The calculation was that NATO members, who had just completed a humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan, would not want to sink into a new international spiral. He also believed that U.S. and EU resolutions would be weakened after the war broke out, by food shortages, inflation, and soaring energy prices. But the West's agreement on the Ukraine war was very solid. As a result, the U.S. has decided to provide $8.5 billion in financial aid to the Ukrainian government, and about $18 billion in military aid combined by August 2020. U.S. support items included high-speed mobile artillery rocket system (HIMARS), 75,000 155mm shells, 20 120mm mortars, 20,000 120mm mortars, munitions for high-tech ground-to-air missile systems (NASAMS), and 1,000 Jablin anti-tank missiles etc. A total of 21 support was provided until September after the war, with $600 million in equipment and ammunition to be provided after September (Blinken 2022).

〈Figure 1〉 Government support to Ukraine: Type of assistance, € billion



Commitments Jan. 24, 2022 to Feb. 24, 2023. Data on 41 donors ; scroll to see more donors

■ Military ■ Humanitarian ■ Financial                     Select the type of aid ▢

| United States | 43.2 | 24.5 |
| EU Institutions | 30.3 | |
| United Kingdom | 6.6 | |
| Germany | | |
| Japan | 5.7 | |
| Netherlands | | |
| Canada | | |
| Poland | | |
| Norway | | |
| France | | |

Source: Trebesch et al. (2023) "The Ukraine Support Tracker" Kiel WP          ifw-kiel.de/ukrainetracker

Source:
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/?cookieLevel=not-set (Searched Date: April 26, 2023).

〈Figure 2〉 Government support to Ukraine: By donor country GDP, incl. and excl.



Commitments Jan. 24, 2022 to Feb. 24, 2023. Data on 40 donor countries; scroll to see more countries

■ Bilateral aid (% of GDP)  ■ Share of EU aid (% of GDP)       Change composition ⬚

| | Bilateral aid | EU aid |
|---|---|---|
| Latvia | 1.2% | 0.2% |
| Estonia | 1.1% | 0.2% |
| Lithuania | 0.9% | 0.2% |
| Poland | 0.6% | 0.3% |
| Netherlands | 0.5% | 0.3% |
| Norway | 0.7% | |
| Bulgaria | 0.4% | 0.3% |
| Czech Republic | 0.4% | 0.2% |
| Finland | 0.4% | 0.2% |
| Denmark | 0.3% | 0.3% |

Source: Trebesch et al. (2023) "The Ukraine Support Tracker" Kiel WP       ifw-kiel.de/ukrainetracker

Military, financial, and humanitarian aid promised by major European countries to Ukraine from January 24 to August 3, 2022 are as follows. There are 41 countries that have supported Ukraine in the form of aid, including military, humanitarian, and financial aid. Among them, the U.S. ranks first in aid with a total of 44.5 billion euros. Various institutions in the EU are followed by Britain, Germany, Canada, Poland, France, Norway, and Japan. Korea ranked 25th in the amount of support. The United States has the largest amount of military aid with 15 billion euros, followed by Britain, Poland, Germany, Canada, the Czech Republic,

Denmark, Latvia, Australia, and Estonia. Estonia has the highest aid-to-GDP ratio of 1.2 percent, Latvia 1.1 percent, Poland 1 percent, Czech 0.6 percent, Lithuania 0.6 percent, Slovakia and Norway 0.4 percent, Bulgaria 0.3 percent, the United States and Britain 0.2 percent, indicating that the Baltic and small European countries support Ukraine a lot (Kiel Institute 2022).

When the UN Secretary General took the urgent situation that was being developed in Korea and urged the UN member nations to send troops to Korea on July 14, 1950, the number of participating nations greatly increased. 21 Countries that deployed combat units and medical units; India, Sweden, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Australia, Belgium, Luxemburg, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Republic of South Africa, Greece, Thailand, Turkey, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States, Philiphines. The aid reached 20 countries, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and Cuba. Those countries located far away from Korea, such as Ethiopia, the Republic of South Africa, and Colombia in South America, also participated in the 6 · 25 Korean War. When they decided to help Koreans in the war, these countries put a severe importance to the role of the UN (Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, Rep. of Korea 2022). The United Nations has established a military crisis organization that can exercise force for the first time in the history of the United Nations, including the establishment of the United Nations Command and the appointment of a commander. Most countries who joined the UN forces during the 6 · 25 Korean War were worried about the expansion of communism around them. They saw the North's invasion of South Korea as a steppingstone for a more serious communist threat in the future.

The Ukraine war and the 6 · 25 Korean War have something in common; dozens of countries, including international political powers, punished aggressors globally and spared no support to the invaded countries. It is why that most members of the international community sympathized with the illegal invasion by Russia and North Korea, both of which had a desire to defeat the aggressors and return Ukraine and South Korea to the prewar period, including territory.

Following the Ukrainian war, Russian President Vladimir Putin has spent

considerable time and energy fostering a new axis of dictatorship that leads Russia to closer cooperation with China, North Korea, and Iran, creating a powerful anti-Western dictatorship group. Sharing a standard set of anti-American grievances and anti-Western objects, the detectors are finding new ways to work together on both the tactical and strategic levels. For example, Russia is using gas trade with China as its currency to avoid U.S. sanctions and is also strengthening military cooperation.

Russia is strengthening cooperation with some autocratic countries, but it will not proceed in a different global structure than the Cold War in the past. For now, there are few dictatorships in which Russia can cooperate, such as China, Iran, and North Korea, and there is no guarantee that efforts to build dictatorships between them will succeed (Rogin 2022). Dictators have trouble trusting each other. There is a limit to what North Korea or Iran can actually provide. Meanwhile, Russia's growing dependence on China is a big problem for Putin in the long run. However, the confrontation between the Western camp and Russia is expected to continue until Russia develops into a free democracy, expands freedom of speech, prevents access by the system, and gives up its imperialist policy to restore the Russian Empire's past glory to neighboring countries.

As previously stated, the 6·25 Korean War played a crucial role in entrenching the Cold War in the 20th century and served as a breakwater against Korea's communism. Korea has become a model for U.N. members and other members of the international community who have provided support for the 6·25 Korean War by preventing communism through the 6·25 Korean War and making the world a developed country despite the ruins of the postwar war. In addition, the 6·25 Korean War, which served as an opportunity to solidify the Cold War, reminded us that securing military deterrence against North Korea is essential to prevent a recurrence of war on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, the 6·25 Korean War became a successful example of the collective security system through the United Nations. Many battles did not easily invoked after the 6·25 Korean War due to difficulties in reaching an agreement with the Security Council. The formation of UN multinational forces reactivated UN collective security in the

wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

## 3. Occupation policy and inhumane behavior

Both the Ukraine war and the 6 · 25 Korean War will be recorded as wars in which the same nation  invaded them, or one bloodline and civilians suffered tremendously from the invaders. Soldiers also cause Civilian damage from invading countries, including cases of Koreans sympathizing with the invaders. South Korea and North Korea were divided by ideology, but each member was the same nation. Ukrainians and Russians are members of the same Eastern Slavic tribe, and the people have the exact historical origin. The war between relatives is more brutal than the result of invasion by other national groups, and the invaders committed many cruel acts during the war. This brutality by ethnic groups with the same roots can be examined in three aspects: occupation policy, service members, and atrocities.

First, occupation policy is related to the reality of governance in occupied areas. In Ukraine, Russia has already exposed a cross-section of its occupation policy through the "Russification Policy" since 2014 in the eastern Donbas occupation region (International audience outreach 2021). Just as the Russian government recognized the separatists Donetsk and Luhansk as states in Donbas, it recognized parts of Ukraine as States, and the pro-Russian region also prepared procedures for integration. On 24 February 2022, President Putin recognized States in Donetsk and Luhansk for their independence from Ukraine. Since then, Russian troops have occupied southern areas such as Kherson, and governments established with the support of the Russian government in Russian military occupation have prepared for a unified Russian referendum as in Crimea in 2014 (Miller etc. 2022) Russia quickly held a annexation referendum on whether to merge with Russia in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporiza, and Khersson in late September, following the loss and retreat of its main stronghold, Kharkiu, etc., in the northeast front in early September, 2022. As a result of the invasion, Russia solidified the land it had forcibly occupied into its territory during the war, prompting suspicion that

Russia was trying to counterattack with nuclear weapons if Ukrainian forces attacked the annexed territory (Ekberova 2022).

Russia's occupation policy aims to promote rapid 'Russification'. To this end, President Putin signed a presidential decree on July 11, 2022, to expand the simplification of the Russian nationality acquisition process to all Ukrainians.[6] This policy allowed residents of Donetsk and Luhansk, as well as residents of Khersson and Zaporiza, who were already eligible, to obtain Russian citizenship easily and let all Ukrainians to receive Russian citizenship in a simplified process. Russia's approach is to apply the same structure as the 2014 military occupation of Crimea and annexation through a referendum (Srivastava 2022).

Russia used the Russian ruble as legal currency in the occupied area, including Khersson and some parts of the Japoriza. In addition, Russian-style systems were introduced in these regions, with public documents changed to Russian-style. Russian-style education programs were also implemented in the occupied territories to raise Ukrainian students as "Russian citizens." At the same time, Russia established a new joint military and civilian government in the occupied territories, and in major cities, it was replaced by a Russian-appointed mayor (Srivastava 2022). While Russia was preparing for a referendum to join Russia as planned, Ukraine fired back from the northeast and recaptured Harikiu and others. Russia appears to be trying to negotiate a cease-fire or an end the war after consolidating its position in the occupied territories. If Ukraine enters a cease-fire with Western pressure to stop the war, Ukraine could be divided like the Korean Peninsula. Ukraine's human rights ombudsman, told POLITICO that Russia is systematically working to wipe out Ukrainian people and culture. She provided information and documents she said were obtained by Ukrainian intelligence services proving Russia's plan for this began even before Feb. 24 (Miller etc. 2022).

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6) "Путин подписал указ о гражданстве РФ для прожи вающих в ДНР, ЛНР и на Украине," accessed July 11, 2022, Известия, https://iz.ru/1363067/2022-07-11/putin-podpisal-ukaz-o-grazhdanstve-rf-dlia-prozhivaiushc hikh-v-dnr-lnr-i-ukraine(Searched Date: April 28, 2023).

Just as Russia had a structure of occupational rule in the Ukrainian war, North Korea in the 6 · 25 Korean War also thoroughly prepared policy measures to be taken in the occupied areas of South Korea even before invading South Korea. The day after the opening of the war, North Korea's supreme leader Kim Il-sung said in a broadcast speech that the task to be done during the 6 · 25 Korean War was to defend the Constitution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to overthrow the Lhee Seung-man puppet regime, and to achieve reunification of the country under the banner of the People's Committee (Kwon 1989, 79-80). The War of Liberation of the Fatherland against the American imperialists' invasion defined the war's character. To this end, in the occupied area, the party, political groups, and the People's Committee, policy enforcement, were organized first and then began to work on Sovietization, including land reform. In short, it set a goal to renovate South Korea in the same form as the Soviet-style communist country established in North Korea. In addition, residents were requisitioned as forced conscripts for wartime mobilization (in North Korean terms, "the volunteer army"), while committing evil acts such as arrest, imprisonment, kidnapping, and execution of so-called "reaction forces" such as right-wing figures.

Since North Korea prepared meticulously even before the war, it proceeded with its rule over the occupied area without mistake. The North Korean military first formed a People's Committee based on the leftists in the region. When forming the People's Committee, elections were used, although formal. After that, various social organizations were organized. South Korean left-wing forces actively participated in these organizations, and ordinary residents, not left-wingers, were also forced to participate by the instruction of the North Korean military. As such, the left-wing forces in South Korea were the driving forces that moved the communist organization that ruled the occupied area of South Korea. The leftists of the occupied area in South Korea helped North Korea to hunt and punish right-wing forces such as police and military families and arrested and kidnapped influential figures. The most problematic of the evils committed by the South Korean leftists in communist-occupied areas is the massacre of civilians. This massacre of civilians should be dealt with mercilessly by instruction of Kim Il-sung (The Association

of Modern Thought 2010, 105-116).

There is a reason why the North Korean military could not help but use left-wing or subordinate figures. It was also inevitable to rely on the left-wing from the neighborhood to determine who was a police or military family member, a landlord, a capitalist, and a right-wing figure. It was ultimately up to them to find out where their homes were and where they were hiding (The Association of Modern Thought 2010, 116-117).

Second, the actions of wartime servants who served the enemy (North Korea) are mentioned. The civilian casualties caused by the servants varied, including slaughter, disappearance, kidnapping, forced conscription, and mobilization of efforts. The war in Ukraine is not over yet. However, despite being at war, the amount that has already been revealed is enormous. Therefore, since the Ukraine war record is the current type that is still being collected, it has no choice but to present the overall characteristics rather than revealing the exact figures. First, there is forced conscription of civilians in occupied areas. Russian troops committed various war crimes in Ukraine, of which the notorious is the massacre and forced conscription of civilians. On April 22, 2022, CNN reported allegations that Russian troops were planning to forcibly recruit civilians in southern Ukraine's Khersson and Zaporiza provinces. If true, it constitutes a war crime in violation of the Geneva Convention. The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense said that as Russian troops prepared for forced conscription in Khersson and Zaporiza to compensate for the loss of troops, local residents, including men aged to be conscripted in the occupied area, were prevented from fleeing. Russia intended to create militias, such as the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which are pro-Russian rebel-held areas, so that the Ukrainian people could join the Russian side to fight against the Ukrainian army.[7] The British Ministry of Defense said that even if a Ukrainian is conscripted or voluntarily enlisted under Russian law, the Ukrainian enlistment itself could

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7) The British Ministry of Defense said that even if a Ukrainian is conscripted or voluntarily enlisted under Russian law, the Ukrainian enlistment itself could violate Article 51 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. The clause states that occupation forces should not use propaganda to forcibly recruit or enlist residents of occupied areas (Casciani 2022).

violate Article 51 of the Fourth geneva Convention. The clause states that occupation forces should not use propaganda to forcibly recruit or enlist residents of occupied areas (Casciani 2022).

It is also revealed that Russia forcibly moved many of its residents to Russia. Lyudmila Denisova, head of the Ukrainian parliament's human rights committee, said in a telegram that Russia forced Mariupol residents to move to Krimorsky, Russia's far eastern region 8,000 kilometers from mainland Ukraine (Murray 2022). The Ukrainian government estimated that the Russian government forcibly deported about 45,000 Ukrainians to Russia by early April after the start of the war under the guise of humanitarian evacuation. As the war continued afterwards, it is estimated that there would be more forced migration of Ukrainians to Russia. On July 13, 2022, U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinkon said that 900,000 to 1.6 million Ukrainians were forcibly relocated to Russia, claiming that Russia was conducting a "purification operation" that was notorious in Chechnya and other places in the past. It said 260,000 children were among them (Tsui 2022). This situation can be seen as Russia is taking pre-planned action. Russia's cleanup operation includes separating families and confiscating Ukrainian passports to change the population composition in parts of Ukraine. Blinkon said Russian authorities are deliberately separating Ukrainian children from their parents kidnapping them from orphanages and adopting them from Russia. The illegal transfer and deportation of protected persons is a severe violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians and an act to continue to be condemned as a war crime. At the end of June, Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister Irina Vresuk claimed that Russia had forcibly relocate 1.2 million of her country. The number includes 240,000 children, including 2,000 orphans (Lee, Hyun taek 2022). In march, 2023, the international criminal court (ICC) in The Hague has indicted the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and children's commissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova, for the mass abduction of Ukrainian children (Koshiw, 2023). For Russia, it seems to be aiming to increase the Slavic population by kidnapping it to Russia, where the population is declining, and weakening Ukraine through pro-Russian anti-Ukraine education.

In the 6·25 Korean War, North Korea recklessly recruited young people from

occupied areas and sent them to the battlefield under 'the volunteer army.' The North Korean military forcibly recruited about 150,000 young people for three months from July 1, 1950, when the U.S. ground troops were decided to be deployed. The number is similar to North Korean soldiers at the time. They were deployed on behalf of the North Korean military in the Battle of the Nakdong River, where many victims were killed. The North Korean army tied steel ropes to their legs to prevent them from escaping from the battlefield. About 70 to 80 percent of the North's main forces, including the 4th, 13th, and 15th divisions, were recruited from the South, who immediately deployed to the battlefield with little military training, and were not adequately supplied with weapons (Park 2009, 216-217). In the 6 · 25 Korean War, the North Korean military sent a so-called "blocking detachments" to the rear of the unit in the process of forcibly recruiting young people from the South and putting them into battle, giving them the role of shooting soldiers from behind. In the Ukraine war, there was also a revelation that Russian troops deployed Chechen-blocking detachments in the Khersson area, which restored during the Ukrainian counterattack in September.[8] More confirmation is needed, but if Russia, which had a tradition of dictatorship since the Stalin era, is using it again, it is revealing Russia's brutality and human rights abuses against civilians committed by Russia in the future.

North Korea kidnaped 82,959 people during the 6 · 25 Korean War, which is only based on official records and is estimated to have been more. The kidnapped swept away the talents needed for the development of Korea, including politicians, scholars, artists, and engineers. North Korea has scoured and dragged key South Korean figures because it recognized them as necessary for North Korea's revival while draining South Korea's human resources (Heo 2010, 453-466).

Third, the brutal atrocities against civilians were carried out by invaders and collaborators. All wars are cruel. The war between the same ethnic nation group is as fierce as the invasion by foreign nations. the 6 · 25 Korean War is a typical

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8) "Kadyrov's Retreat-Blocking Detachments Deployed In Kherson Region," August 18, 2022, https://charter97.org/en/news/2022/8/16/511471/(Searched Date: 2022.9.28).

case in point.

With the start of the war in Ukraine, President Putin offered the cause of the invasion, but it is hard to believe that it is Russia's real cause. Ukraine's deterrence from joining NATO and Ukraine's "de-Nazification" and "demilitarization" are just grounds for rationalizing Russia's invasion. Putin's accusation that Ukraine has become a neo-Nazi is completely groundless and without justification. But Russia's Propaganda, which demonizes Ukraine as a "Nazi," was accompanied by brutal violence. Russian army educated Russian soldiers on the battlefield that Ukraine was 'neo-Nazified'(McCallum 2022). Putin and other war-torn Russian leadership positions were, in effect, taking away Ukraine's sovereignty as the first target of invasion.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine aims to gain practical benefits by taking control of eastern and southern coastal areas of Ukraine. Above all, Russia wants to secure access to the core resources it needs. In particular, mining, steel, and munitions industries have developed in eastern Ukraine, with more than 90% of Russian-speaking population. The eastern region, which the Russian Empire has ruled by since the 17th century, has been greatly influenced by Russia, and if it merges with Russia, Russia is a base region that can benefit a lot. On the other hand, Western historical and cultural traditions are strongly influenced by Poland, Austria, and Hungary in western Ukraine. Russia invaded the eastern region, where Ukrainian nationalist sentiment is relatively more likely to be "Russianized" than west Ukraine to shrink Ukrainian territory and weaken its national power to become subordinate to Russia. If Russia successfully takes control of eastern Ukraine, including the Donbas region, it will ramp up its attacks to seize the southern coastal region of Ukraine. These attacks aim to turn Ukraine into an "inland country" without an ocean, becoming an economically independent state. At this time, Ukraine has no choice but to experience the pain of being blocked from exporting and unable to engage in international exchanges through the sea.

# Ⅳ. Changes in War in the 21st Century

## 1. The restrictions of warring countries

At the end of World War II there were virtually no wars of the same size as World War II, or smaller, but dozens of countries participated in battles in one region except the 6 · 25 Korean War. The war in Iraq, where multinational forces were dispatched immediately after the Vietnam War and the end of the Cold War, was also a limited-scale international war. Still, it was different from the 6 · 25 Korean War in terms of the number of participating countries. In the 21st century, as experienced in the 20th century, there were no large-scale wars involving many countries. The Ukraine war is also fighting with limited participating countries due to the war between Russia and Ukraine. Belarus, which is close to Russia fully supports Russia as it participates in the war with Russia, but the confrontation follows the basic structure of Ukraine versus Russia. In this regard, unlike the 6 · 25 Korean War, the countries directly participating are limited to two countries, which are likely to be maintained until the war's end. The reasons Ukraine's war participants are limited can be suggested as follows.

First, no country automatically intervenes despite Russia's illegal invasion because Ukraine has no country establishing an alliance system, such as NATO. Ukraine has pushed for NATO membership, but Russia has invaded it as it has expressed its willingness to push for NATO membership again, including stipulating NATO membership in the Constitution after Zelensky took power. After the war broke out, NATO gave Ukraine significant aid, including weapons and humanitarian aid, but made it clear that it was impossible to send troops. The U.S. has also strongly expressed its reluctance to send U.S. troops outside the America to wage war, from Trump's presidency to Biden, Instead, it has focused on implementing the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Second, Ukraine is not NATO-affiliated, so it cannot counterattack Russia. Invading Russia is not available in the real world. If Russia, the invading party, exercises its right to veto as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council,

based on the U.N. spirit of denying the war. As a result, the UN united in condemning and punishing Russia despite its apparent aggression in violation of the UN Charter and showing signs of helplessness. These UN limitations have led to the theory of UN uselessness, raising questions about whether the UN is an organization that can play its role in international peace.

Third, the peace mood, which spread with the advent of the post-Cold War after the end of the Cold War, has long dominated, especially in Europe. Integrated into the European Union, Europe did not focus on building military power, believing that most countries could join NATO and protect their own security by common defense. As a result, few countries, except for countries like the Baltic States, which directly feel threatened by Russia, have maintained the 2% defense-to-GDP ratio agreed by NATO countries. Since the agreement reached at the 2006 NATO talks, former U.S. presidents, including Obama, Trump, and Biden, have consistently demanded European countries to increase defense spending but have not worked. Only after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 did countries such as the United Kingdom, Poland, Romania, and Greece increase defense costs to around 2% of GDP (Hutt 2022). Western European countries were dominated by the idea that there was no possibility of war and that they could form a cooperative defense system. As a result, they even scrapped many heavy weapons from the army, including tanks and self-propelled artillery. As Russia's threat grows, more European countries are reinforcing their defense capabilities after Russia invaded Ukraine. Still, Europe's overall preparedness for war could only improve its security if it provides troops or heavy offensive weapons to Ukraine with proper armament. Under these circumstances, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is an anachronistic act that begins the forgotten "era of war" in Europe. Over time, Russia will become isolated from the international community.

## 2. The Way of War: Cyber Warfare and Unmanned Weapons

In addition to the traditional ground, sea, and sky, the space where modern warfare is carried out is often mentioned by including cyberspace and outer space.

However, given that only a handful of countries, other than the United States, are still capable of carrying out space warfare, the field of conductible cyber warfare is expanding more broadly. The war in Ukraine is forcing experts to rethink ideas about war and is becoming a serious test for armaments. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began last year, dozens of countries have moved to support Ukraine by providing it with humanitarian and military aid as a matter of principle. Among the weapons supplied to the Ukrainian armed forces are both long-used and relatively new pieces of equipment. For all of them, the full-scale war in Europe has become a kind of test of their effectiveness in the conditions of modern combat operations (Poznyakov 2022).

Brad Lendon classified three weapons that changed the course of Ukraine's war with Russia, as Javelin, HIMARS, Bayraktar TB2 drone.

Javlin is "fire and forget" weapon. At the beginning of the war, fighters on both sides were expecting Russian armored columns to begin rolling into the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv within days. The Ukrainians needed something that could blunt that attack - and found it in the form of the Javelin, a shoulder-fired, guided anti-tank missile that can be deployed by a single individual. As soon as Javlin's operator takes the shot, they are able to run for cover while the missile finds its way to the target. The Javelin is also good at targeting the weak spot of the Russian tanks — their horizontal surfaces — because its trajectory after launch sees it curve upwards then fall on the target from above, according to Lockheed Martin (Lendon 2023).

The M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) is a full-spectrum, combat-proven, all-weather, 24/7, lethal and responsive, wheeled precision strike weapons system. HIMARS is a C-130 air transportable wheeled launcher mounted on 5-ton Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles XM1140A1 truck chassis organic/assigned to Field Artillery Brigades. The current HIMARS includes an increased crew protection armored cab. HIMARS supports an expeditionary, lethal, survivable, and tactically mobile force. It will launch all Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Family of Munitions rockets and missiles (USA ASC 2023). In Ukraine War, HIMARS stroke on a Russian base at Kherson's airport in territory Moscow's

forces had occupied at the time. The strikes have forced the Russians to move their ammunition depots farther to the rear, thereby reducing the available firepower of Russian artillery near the front lines and making logistical support more difficult (Lendon 2023).

The Bayraktar TB2 is a Tactical Armed / UAV System, developed and manufactured by Baykar. A highly sophisticated design that provides all solutions that operator may need in one integrated system. The system consists of Bayraktar TB2 Armed / UAV Platform, Ground Control Station, Ground Data Terminal, Remote Display Terminal, Advanced Base with Generator and Trailer modules. TB2 has proven its efficacy with over 500.000 of operational flight hours. Since 2014, it keeps carrying out missions successfully within the Turkish Armed Forces, Gendarmerie and the Turkish National Police. Currently, 257 Bayraktar platforms are at the service of Turkey, Qatar, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Bayraktar TB2 holds the record in the Turkish aviation history for endurance (with 27 hours 3 minutes) and for altitude (with 25.030 feet) (BAYKAR 2023). It's relatively cheap, made with off-the-shelf parts, packs a lethal punch and records its kills on video. Those videos have shown it taking out Russian armor, artillery and supply lines with the missiles, laser-guided rockets and smart bombs it carries. Indeed, a plan to set up an assembly line for the drones in Ukraine was in the works even before the war. And using the drones potentially has saved the lives of Ukrainian pilots who would otherwise have had to carry out the missions (Lendon 2023).

The Ukraine war also saw a fierce cyber war between the two countries. Since shortly after the war began, Ukraine leaders in Kyiv made an unusual ask. They called for on IT professionals in Ukraine and worldwide to help defend the nation against cyberattacks. IT professionals went to their keyboards to help. And in the six months since the invasion, Ukraine and its international allies have become more organized, focused, and determined than ever to keep Russian hackers on the back foot. The IT Army is making it hard for Russian hackers to do the things they did on the front end of the war, like take down the satellite system or try to plant malware in utilities (Martin). From propaganda to air defense, this war is one in which the proliferation of computation and information

technologies has produced a battlefield environment far different from earlier conventional engagements of the post-Cold War period. Microsoft asserts with great of confidence that during the war Russia launched "destructive cyberattacks with Ukraine, network penetration and espionage outside Ukraine, and cyber influence operations targeting people around the world (Smith 2022)." Although some experts feel Microsoft's claims are overblown (Smally 2022), the pattern of cyberattacks against Ukraine being discovered and mitigated seems clear. The Defense Department's U.S. Cyber Command made contributions by releasing cyber indicators of compromise valuable to the Ukrainians and available by Pastebin to everyone else (Bronk etc. 2022). The Ukraine war showed that the role of computer systems in 21st century war is expanding. Ukraine has outperformed Russia in its cyber defense and its counterattacks (perhaps with significant aid from its NATO supporters).

# Ⅴ. A Postwar Prospect

Comparing the Ukraine war with the 6 · 25 Korean War, despite the different times and regions, there are more in common than differences. Ukraine and South Korea were invaded by neighboring countries of the same ethnic group or Slavic state as newly independent countries. Preserving sovereignty and maintain national independence, the two countries took the lead in defeating the invaders with one mind. Of course, war leaves ruins, but it will also be expected because it is used as a driving force for national development. Since the international community condemned the invading country and helped both material and material during the war, we look forward to overcoming the ashes and developing the country after the war. Korea has become an exemplary example in this regard, and Ukraine is expected to show its development in the future, like postwar Korea.[9] It is encouraging that the Ukrainian government has cited Korea, and

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9) It is encouraging that the Ukrainian government has cited Korea along with advanced

advanced European countries, as a model for national reconstruction since war's end. The reconstruction plan announced by the Ukrainian government in July 2022 included south Korea as a significant example of "improving the company-friendly system (Cho 2022)." War leaves tremendous damage and psychological scars, but it provides the people with a chance of unity and an opportunity to identify and remove internal enemies reliably.

As a result of the 6 · 25 Korean War, South Korea firmly established a military alliance with the United States. In response to South Korean President Syngman Rhee's persistent demands during the ceasefire negotiations, the U.S. finally promised to sign the Korea-U.S. military alliance treaty at the same time as the signed. As a result, Korea and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America on October 1, 1953. The treaty officially entered into force in November 1954. The Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty stipulates that external armed attacks on South Korea and the U.S. legally controlled territories are considered to jeopardize their peace and security and will be jointly dealt with by the constitutional procedures of each country.[10] Eventually, the establishment of the Korea-U.S. alliance system made South Korea play a decisive role in preventing North Korea from re-invading, and became the cornerstone of South Korea's economic development after the war. Unlike NATO, the Korea-U.S. alliance does not have an automatic intervention clause in the event of a fight. Still, the U.S. deployed two divisions to South Korea to help curb North Korea's invasion.

During the war with Russia, Ukraine won the EU candidate status as the first step toward EU membership (Parker 2023). Ukraine's immediate goal is to secure a deterrent against Russia through NATO membership. Still, EU membership will

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European countries as a model for national reconstruction since the end of the war. The reconstruction plan announced by the Ukrainian government in July 2022 included South Korea as a major example in relation to "improving the company-friendly system (Cho 2022)."

10) "Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America," https://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/listSubjectDescription.do?id=005139&sitePage=.( Searched Date: 2022.9.26).

be a factor in promoting NATO membership in the long run when NATO membership is not possible immediately. NATO membership requires approval from all of its members, with several countries, including France and Germany, consistently opposing Ukraine's accession to NATO in the past, but the Ukraine war in 2022 helped to move Ukraine's justification for its opposition to NATO membership. In other words, the most prominent 2021 reason Germany and France opposed Ukraine's entry into NATO is that the Ukraine war not only showed Russian aggression but also retaliated against Europe by stopping natural gas exports and Europe's search for self-rescue measures. The biggest threat in Europe is Russia's military expansion and threats to its neighbors, including NATO countries. Russia's invasion of Ukraine thus effectively turned NATO into an anti-Russian security alliance. The fact that Sweden and Finland abandoned their long tradition of neutrality during the Ukraine war and applied for NATO membership proves paradoxically.

Both the Ukraine war and the 6·25 Korean War reminded us that securing deterrence by strengthening military power in Ukraine and the Korean Peninsula, which are strategic points, is the best security response. Since establishing an alliance structure is the most effective way to secure deterrence in preparation for the re-invasion of the invading country, Korea established the Korea-U.S. alliance at the end of the 6·25 Korean War, and Ukraine is also expected to achieve NATO membership in the long run. Securing military deterrence plays a major role in bringing about economic stability and improving the investment environment. Both South Korea and Ukraine, as non-nuclear countries, can achieve self-defense without going against the international security order through the Korea-U.S. alliance and NATO membership in the long run.

# Ⅵ. Conclusion

Ukraine and South Korea have something in common in that they have pursued national construction and development in response to the threat of Russia and

North Korea. While Korea began building a modern state in 1948, 70 years later, Ukraine has 30 years of experience in building an independent state after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Korea will complete the modern nation-state system when it overcomes division and achieves unification. Ukraine will thoroughly enjoy its sovereignty as an independent state only when it is free from security threats and Russian influence. Ukraine's independence will allow it to be recognized as a member of the European Union and to join the coalition of democratic states when it ceases to be a free democracy away from Russian influence.

the 6 · 25 Korean War was the most disastrous and devastating war ever fought on the Korean Peninsula. About 1.5 million soldiers from 25 countries fought a mini-world war During the 6 · 25 Korean War. As a result, 18 million people, more than half of the population of the two Koreas, including 620,000 South Koreans, 160,000 U.N. soldiers, 930,000 North Koreans, 1 million Chinese soldiers, 2.5 million civilians, 3.7 million refugees, 300,000 war widows, 100,000 war orphans, and 10 million separated families, were damaged (Yang etc. 2005, 142). After the war in Ukraine, we will know the total number of people affected, but there are still many casualties in the war, adding to the regret.

As a result of comparing the Ukraine war with the 6 · 25 Korean War in this paper, it was found that it has the most inhumane aspects among the characteristics of the 20th century war. It has something in common; first, they started the war with empty arguments that had no validity in the cause of the war. As a result, it turned out that both wars only met the state's "attack by a formal army" among the requirements to justify the beginning of the war in the "war of justice" theory. There was no declaration of war, and the justification for war was insufficient.

Second, the Ukraine war and the 6 · 25 Korean War broke out as due to the arbitrary decision of the supreme leader in the non-expert dictatorship on war and military strategy.

Third, it is also common for the international community to step up to support Korea and Ukraine, which invaded due to unfair rationalization of the invasion war.

Fourth, Russia and North Korea, which started the war, had already established

a meticulous occupation policy before the war, and committed inhumane acts against civilians, including torture, slaughter, and kidnapping in the occupied areas. In particular, Russia has committed unimaginable inhumane atrocities, kidnapped many Ukrainian children and moving them to Russia.

The commonalities between the Ukraine war and the 6·25 Korean War evoked the darkest aspects of the 20th century war marked by irrational decisions and anti-humanitarian acts as recalled. the 6·25 Korean War and Russia's invasion of Ukraine both violated the principles of just war except for the "authorized actor" category. However, the Ukraine war is different from the 20th century war in that it was used as a war using advanced weapons such as cyber warfare and drones due to the characteristics of the technology and network society developed in the 21st century. In addition, the fact that no countries want to directly intervene in the Ukraine war due to the anti-war sentiment of the 21st century created after the post-Cold War is working differently than in the past.

War is cruel. The fact that it is proceeding with exposing the dark side of the 20th century war in a crisis where human and family are suffering, and the country is on the verge of survival is causing pain and hurt to humanity After all, the war in Ukraine, which stems from Russia's wrong decision, is likely to have consequences that speed up the end of Putin's regime. Russia tries to revive imperialism that ended in the 20th century in the 21st century, but as time goes by, Russia's attempts will be ignored. Even so, it has reached the stage where the world community, which is currently at war, must work together to put further pressure and act to end the wrong war.

Finally, the lessons learned from comparing the 6·25 Korean War and the Ukrainian War are as follows.

First, it shows that war occurs more readily when an aggressor has the confidence to win through a preemptive strike. North Korea and Russia are expected to win quickly if they start a war, judging that their military power is superior to South Korea and Ukraine. However, in the case of an invasion war for territorial occupation, it could never be won because there was no justification for starting the war or because the international community could not support the invaded

country.

Second, the structure of the domestic system in which the supreme leader of the dictatorship's willingness to wage war determines the war decision has a decisive influence. In the case of North Korea, even other executives, besides a small number of leaders who participated in the war command, used deception to the extent that they believed it was South Korea, not North Korea. Russia enacted domestic laws to punish the Ukrainian war if it referred to it as a war. In other words, it is common for leaders to decide entirely on war and control public opinion after the outbreak of war.

Third, it should be noted that aggressors use deceptive tactics to appear peaceful and cover up their war preparations just before the outbreak of war. In this regard, the Ukrainian and Korean Wars remind us of how decisive "peace through power" is for the country's survival. It also clearly shows that the power of information to detect the enemy's preparations for war and the ability of the national leadership to judge based on it properly is also essential.

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| 국문요약 |

# 우크라이나 전쟁과 6·25전쟁의 공통점과 그 의미

우 평 균

한국학중앙연구원 책임연구원

우크라이나 전쟁과 6·25전쟁은 각각 21세기와 20세기의 제한된 규모의 국제 분쟁을 나타내며, 2차 세계대전 이후 유럽과 아시아에서 영토 획득을 위한 최초의 침략 전쟁이라는 점에서 유사성이 있다. 이 두 전쟁은 세 가지 측면에서 유사성을 공유한다. 6·25전쟁과 러시아의 우크라이나 침공은 모두 "인정된 행위자" 범주를 제외하고 '정의로운 전쟁(Jusr War)'의 원칙을 위반했다. 첫째, 침략자는 침략 당사자에 대해 타당성이 부족한 개전의 명분을 통해 전쟁을 정당화하려고 시도했다. 둘째, 두 전쟁 모두 전쟁과 군사 전략에 관한 식견이 부족한 지도자의 자의적인 결정에 의해 이루어졌다. 국내체제의 문제인 독재는 체제상 비합리적인 전쟁 결정을 용이하게 했다. 셋째, 국제 사회는 침략 전쟁을 합리화하기 위한 부당한 시도를 인식하고 우크라이나와 한국을 지지하기 위해 결집했다. 또한, 이들 전쟁의 발단 국가인 러시아와 북한은 전쟁 이전에 이미 치밀하게 점령 정책을 수립하여 점령 지역에서 고문, 살해, 민간인 납치 등 비인간적인 행위를 초래했다. 반면 우크라이나 전쟁은 6·25전쟁에는 없었던 21세기 기술 발전과 네트워크 중심 사회로 인해 사이버 전쟁과 드론 등 첨단 무기를 활용한 전쟁터에서 치러진다는 점에서 차별성을 갖고 있다. 궁극적으로 러시아의 잘못된 결정에서 비롯된 우크라이나 전쟁은 푸틴 정권의 붕괴를 가속화하는 결과를 초래할 가능성이 높다.

〈주제어〉 우크라이나 전쟁, 6·25전쟁, 지정학, NATO, 사이버 전쟁