

# Immigrants and politics in France\*

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## Abstract

This paper explores the link between immigration and politics in France, a country with a long history of immigration and a large number of Muslims, owing to its history of colonization in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing from research on racism and ethnocentrism on the one side, and support for the Radical Right on the other, it shows that if a large anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment exists in France, immigration is not by far the first voting motivation, with the only exception of the Front National supporters. But the issue is increasingly polarizing the political debate, pitting against each other a tolerant left and an intolerant far right. A short introductory section presents the evolution of immigration in France, and the recent flows of refugees and asylum seekers, compared to the other European countries. The second section, based on the annual survey on racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia conducted for the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) explores the perceptions of immigrants and refugees. The third one analyses the politicisation of the issue by the Front National and its electoral impact.

**Key words:** Immigration in-France, refugees, anti-immigration, anti-Muslim, Front National

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More than one million people fled their home countries for Europe in 2015, and thousands lost their lives in the process. Meanwhile, the recent Islamic terror attacks in France and Germany have fueled anti-refugee, anti-immigrant, and more specifically anti-Muslim sentiment, as most of these migrants are coming from Muslim countries like Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. This paper explores the link between immigration and politics in France, a country with a long history of immigration (Fischer, Hamidi, 2016; Noiriél, 1988) and a large number of Muslims, due to its history of colonization in North and Sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on research covering racism and ethnocentrism on the one hand, and support for the Radical Right on the other, it shows that while significant anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment exists in France, immigration is far from being the primary voting motivation for anyone but Front National (FN) supporters. However, the issue is increasingly polarizing the political debate, pitting a tolerant Left against an intolerant Far Right. A short introductory section presents the evolution of immigration in France, and the recent flows of refugees and asylum seekers, in comparison with those of other European countries. The second section uses the annual survey on racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia conducted for the National Consultative Commission for Human Rights (CNCDDH) to explore perceptions of immigrants and refugees. The third part analyses the FN's politicization of the issue and its electoral impact.

## 1. Immigration trends in France

Table 1. Evolution and origin of immigrants in France (1962-2013)(%)

	1962	1968	1975	1982	1990	1999	2011	2013
Immigrants in resident population	6.2	6.6	7.4	7.2	7.1	7.1	8.4	8.8
Origin of immigrants								
Europe	78.7	76.4	67.1	57.3	50.4	45	37	46
Africa	14.9	19.9	28	33.2	35.9	39.3	43	30
Asia, Americas, else	6.4	3.7	4.9	9.5	13.7	15.7	20	24

Source: INSEE (2012), Brutel (2014).

According to the census, on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2014, the number of immigrants in France, as defined by place of birth and citizenship at birth (born foreigner in a foreign country) totaled 5.9 million. Their share of the resident population, which had hovered around 7 percent from the 1960s through the 1980s, began to slowly increase in the 1990s reaching 8.8 percent by 2014 (table 1). If one adopts the Eurostat definition, which counts all foreign-born residents as migrants regardless of citizenship at birth, immigrants accounted for 11.9 percent of the population on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2015, ranking France 13<sup>th</sup> among the 28 European Union states<sup>1)</sup>.

The composition of this population has also changed (table 1). At the beginning of the 1960s almost 80 percent of migrants came from other European countries (Italy, Spain, Poland, Portugal), and around 15 percent from Africa. By 1990 the share of European-born immigrants had dropped to 50 percent, while the share of immigrants from the Maghreb and sub Saharan Africa rose to almost 40 percent. After the enlargement of the European Union (2004-2007) and the 2008 economic crisis, the flow of European immigrants started outpacing the flow from Africa again, beginning in 1990. By the end of 2013, 46 percent of France's immigrant population came from Europe, 30 percent from Africa, 14 percent from Asia and 10 percent from elsewhere, mostly the Americas (Brutel 2014). Three fourths come from a non-EU country<sup>2)</sup>.

Given its early start with labor immigration and its ties to former colonies, France stands out not so much for the size of its immigrant population, but rather the weight of the second generation of immigrants, who were born in France to one or two immigrant parents, and are French citizens but still

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1) On January 1st, 2015, France ranked behind Luxemburg (44.2 percent), Cyprus (20.9 percent), Austria (17.2), Belgium (16.9 percent), Sweden (16.4), Estonia (14.7), Latvia (13.4), Croatia (13.3), Ireland (16.2 percent), the United Kingdom (13 percent), Spain (12.7), and Germany (12.6 percent): [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics\\_explained/index.php?title=File:Foreign\\_born\\_population\\_by\\_country\\_of\\_birth,\\_1\\_January\\_2015\\_\(%C2%B9\)\\_YB16.png&oldid=290392](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Foreign_born_population_by_country_of_birth,_1_January_2015_(%C2%B9)_YB16.png&oldid=290392) (accessed October 27, 2016).

2) Eurostat: [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics\\_explained/index.php?title=File:Foreign\\_born\\_population\\_by\\_country\\_of\\_birth,\\_1\\_January\\_2015\\_\(%C2%B9\)\\_YB16.png&oldid=290392](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Foreign_born_population_by_country_of_birth,_1_January_2015_(%C2%B9)_YB16.png&oldid=290392) (accessed October 27, 2016).

perceived as immigrants<sup>3</sup>). They clearly outnumber the first generation (11 percent versus 8 percent) (INSEE 2012). Together, first- and second-generation immigrants represent 26.6 percent of the population between the ages of 25 and 54 living in France – the highest share in the EU, ahead of Sweden (25.8), Austria (25.3), the UK (24.4) and the Netherlands (23)<sup>4</sup>. According to a large-scale survey on immigrants of all origins and their children living in metropolitan France, the “TEO” (Trajectories and Origins) project, around 45 percent declare themselves Muslims (Beauchemin, Hamel, Simon 2016). That is to say that Muslims represented 8 percent of the population between the ages of 18 and 50 living in metropolitan France at the end of 2009, or around 2.8 million people; by comparison, 11.5 million declared themselves Catholics. An extrapolation to the total population yields an estimated 3.9 to 4.1 million declared Muslims (Simon, Tiberj 2013; Beauchemin, Hamel, Simon 2016), or closer to 5 million if one includes all people born in a Muslim country. Either way, France has the largest share of Muslims in Europe, along with Germany<sup>5</sup>).

The number of refugees and asylum seekers is also growing. Their total across the 28 EU states was 435,000 in 2013, 635,000 in 2014, and over 1.3 million in 2015<sup>6</sup>), nearly double the previous high of 1992 that occurred in the wake of the Iron Curtain’s fall and the Soviet Union’s collapse. According to the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA)<sup>7</sup>), from 2014 to 2015, demands for asylum in France increased 24 percent to 80,075, of which France accepted 19,506, a 34 percent year-on-year

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3) INSEE data: [file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/nonna.mayer/Mes%20documents/Downloads/dossier\\_presse\\_complet\\_web%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/nonna.mayer/Mes%20documents/Downloads/dossier_presse_complet_web%20(1).pdf) (accessed October 27, 2016).

4) French data from the TEO (Trajectories and Origins) survey, 2008-2009. At the time, the average in the 27 EU states was 17.2 percent.

5) See recent Pew Institute estimates: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/> (accessed October 27, 2016).

6) Pew analysis of Eurostat data: [http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/pgm\\_2016-08-02\\_europe-asylum-01/](http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/pgm_2016-08-02_europe-asylum-01/) (accessed October 27, 2016).

7) <http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Info-ressources/Statistiques/Tableaux-statistiques/Les-demandes-d-asile> (accessed October 27, 2016).

increase. But France receives only a small share of this flow. Germany accepted around half of the 203,000 asylum applications it received in 2014, followed by Sweden (81,000 requests), Italy (65,000) and France (64,000). Relative to its population size, France ranks even lower, with 114 applications per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015, below the EU average (260) and way behind smaller countries like Hungary (1,770), Sweden (1,600), Austria (1,000) and Norway (590)<sup>8)</sup>.

## 2. Perceptions of immigrants and refugees

### 2.1 *Anti-immigrant sentiment*

However, facts count less than perceptions. There is a general tendency in the public to overestimate the number of immigrants and project fears and hostility towards them. A recent comparative survey on “Perils of perceptions”<sup>9)</sup> shows the gap between numbers and perceptions on several issues. The French perceive that immigrants account for 24 percent of the population, which is 14 percentage points higher than the actual figure. The overestimation is similar in Germany and in Belgium, a little larger in Italy (+17), and a little smaller in the Netherlands and in Great Britain (+ 13 and +12). With regard to Muslims, the French estimate their share of the population to be 31 percent, a record overestimation of 23 percentage points that exceeds that of all the other countries surveyed except for Belgium (+ 16 in Great Britain, + 13 in Germany)<sup>10)</sup>.

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
8) Number of first time asylum applications in 2015 per 100 000 inhabitants in the country: Ibidem: [http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/pgm\\_2016-08-02\\_europe-asylum-02/](http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/08/02/number-of-refugees-to-europe-surges-to-record-1-3-million-in-2015/pgm_2016-08-02_europe-asylum-02/) (accessed October 27, 2016).

9) Conducted by the Ipsos-Mori institute in 2015 in 33 countries, available at: [https://www.ipsos-mori.com/\\_assets/sri/perils/slides/](https://www.ipsos-mori.com/_assets/sri/perils/slides/) (accessed October 27, 2016).

10) The question about Muslims was only asked in the 2014 survey, based on a sample of 14 countries: <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3466/perceptions-are-not-reality-10-things-the-world-gets-wrong.aspx> (accessed October 27, 2016).

Figure 1. Evolution of the anti-immigrant sentiment (%)

Source: French National Election Surveys/Annual CNCDDH Survey



This overestimation is usually paired with the feeling that France has an excessive number of immigrants. Opinion polls show that when directly asked to react to the statement “There are too many immigrants in France”, a majority of respondents “strongly” or “somewhat” agree, with peaks of over 70 percent during periods of economic recession such as the mid ‘90s and the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession (figure 1). This anti-immigrant sentiment is not specific to France; it appears across EU countries. Furthermore, those who think there are too many immigrants tend to have negative opinions about them, and more generally about foreigners, Jews, Muslims and others minorities. Such opinions are part of a more general attitude of “ethnocentrism”<sup>11</sup>), which valorizes the group one identifies with – the in-group, and rejects the others, seen as out-groups. Because this attitude consists of negative images of groups and of their perceived members, some authors refer to it as “group focused enmity” (Zick, Küpper, Wolf 2009). In the French annual Barometer on racism conducted for the National

11) On the origins of the concept see Sumner (2005); Adorno et al.(1950), Levi-Strauss (1952). For a recent reassessment of theories and research on the perception of immigration see Cunningham, Neslek, Banaji (2004); Hainmueller, Hopkins (2014); Ceobanu, Escandell (2010); Mayer, Tiberj (2014).

Commission for Human Rights<sup>12</sup>), the question about the feeling that there are too many immigrants is part of an attitudinal measure of ethnocentrism based on ten questions; the answers are correlated and ranked (Mayer, Michelat, Tiberj, Vitale 2016: 296). The highest degree of ethnocentrism is attributed to those who completely deny Muslims the quality of French citizenship (respondents who “do not agree at all” that they are as French as everyone else – 8 percent of the sample in 2016). They tend to give an intolerant answer to all the other questions. At the other end, the lowest degree of ethnocentrism is attributed to those who do not reject the idea that immigrants mainly come to France to take advantage of its welfare system (all respondents except those who do not agree “at all” or don’t answer – 81 percent of the sample). The feeling that there are too many immigrants is ranked seventh (56 percent). Scores on this general scale of ethnocentrism are tightly correlated with all the other measures of prejudice, including Islamophobia (Mayer, Michelat, Tiberj, Vitale, *ibidem*, 299).

Anti-immigrant feelings are not specific to France. They appear all over Europe, and are actually lower than the European average in France. A recent Pew Center survey asked whether having an *increasing* number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in their society made their country “a better place to live”, a “worse place to live” or “doesn’t make much difference either way”. Of the ten countries studied, France was second to last in terms of the share of respondents who chose the negative answer: 24 percent of the French (and 22 percent of Spaniards) considered that diversity made their country a worse place to live, compared to 63 percent in Greece, 53 percent in Italy, and 31 percent in Germany and in the UK <sup>13</sup>). The same applies to the perception of Muslims. Between 2015 and 2016 their general image has become more negative in the EU. But France is one of the countries with the lowest share of these unfavorable

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12) <http://www.cncdh.fr/fr/publications/rapport-annuel-sur-la-lutte-contre-le-racisme-lantisemitisme-et-la-xenophobie> (accessed October 27, 2016).

13) Pew survey in ten EU countries (France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the UK): <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-not-convinced-growing-diversity-is-a-good-thing-divided-on-what-determines-national-identity/>(accessed October 27, 2016).

views. In 2016, 29 percent of the French sample expressed a negative view of Muslims (versus 24 percent the year before), comparable to the shares in the German and the British samples (respectively 29 and 28 percent), and much smaller than those in Italy, Greece, and Spain (69, 65 and 50 percent), as well as the Netherlands and Sweden (33 percent)<sup>14</sup>. But France is unique with regard to resentment towards the children of immigrants, and specifically those from North Africa (Maghreb), who are seen as troublemakers living on welfare or trafficking, in sharp contrast with their fathers, who are seen as hardworking and deserving labor immigrants<sup>15</sup>. France is the only country in Europe where the second generation has a worse image than the first one (Table 2).

Table 2. Belief in the capacity of children of immigrants born in the country to integrate (%)

	Good	Bad	« Good » minus « Bad » opinions
France	43	55	-12
Sweden	49	43	+6
United Kingdom	55	38	+17
Germany	59	35	+24
Netherlands	61	35	+26
Italy	66	26	+40
Spain	73	22	+51
Portugal	82	11	+71

Source : Transatlantic Trends 2013, in Mayer, Tiberj (2014,167).

## ***2.2. The impact of the refugee crisis***

In light of the 2015 refugee’s crisis, the CNCDDH’s latest Barometer on racism, conducted in January 2016, included new questions exploring perceptions of these new migrant flows. One asked: “France has decided to accept 30,000 people over two years to take part in the European effort to take in refugees. Which of these two statements is closest to your opinion on refugees: “ It is a duty for France

14) October 2016, except Greece (2014): <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/07/11/anti-muslim-views-rise-across-europe/>(accessed October 27, 2016).

15) As clearly seen in a qualitative survey on racism based on semi-directed interviews conducted for the 2013 annual CNCDDH report (CNCDDH 2014, 30-67).



to take in refugees from countries at war” or “France should not take in these refugees because it first needs to help people who cannot find housing and decent living conditions in France”. The sample split on the issue: 41 percent chose the first answer, and a majority of 54 percent chose the second one, prioritizing the needs of the disadvantaged people already living in the country. A second question explored the impact of framing the question: whether it referred to “refugees” or “migrants”, and whether it referred to their country of origin as Syria and Iraq, or Africa. The initial sample was thus randomly split into four subsamples according to the way the question was asked (table 3). Only a minority of respondents, ranging between 15 and 20 percent, were against taking in these people, regardless of how they or country of origin were labeled. A larger minority was accepting (from 21 to 31 percent). A clear majority was in favor of acceptance in principle, but considered it impossible to implement in the present context. The refusal rate was higher for Africans than for Syrians and Iraqis, and higher for migrants than for refugees, ranging from 50 percent for refugees from Syria and Iraq to 62 percent for migrants from Africa (table 3).

**Table 3. Acceptance of refugees and migrants according to the wording of the question (%)**

	Migrants from Syria and Iraq	Refugees from Syria and Iraq	Migrants from Africa	Refugees from Africa
France must accept them	30	30	21	24
Should accept them but the present situation of the country does not allow it	50	49	62	58
Does not have to accept them	18	20	15	16
Dont' know, did not answer	2	1	2	2

CNCDH Annual Survey on racism, 4-11 January 2016.

The French public appears less negative than most of its European counterparts. It is less inclined to believe, for instance, that the flow of refugees will increase the risk of terrorism in the country (46 percent, while the EU median is 59 percent, with highs of 76 in Hungary and 71 in Poland), or that they are more to blame for crime than other groups (24

percent, while the EU median is 30, with highs of 47 in Italy and 46 in Sweden)<sup>16</sup>).

### **3. Anti-immigrant attitudes and politics**

#### ***3.1 The impact of political orientation on anti-immigrant attitudes***

One of the main factors explaining prejudice is lack of education<sup>17</sup>). But political orientation is even more important, regardless of the indicator used to measure it<sup>18</sup>). There is a clear divide between the Right and the Left. The universalistic and egalitarian values defended by the latter act as a guard against intolerance; the values of authority and hierarchy dominate the other end of the political spectrum. One party in particular – the Front National (FN) – has been crusading against immigrants since its creation in 1972 (Dézé, Crépon, Mayer 2015). And since the collapse of communism, it has made Islam the main enemy. At the heart of its platform is the principle of “national preference”: reserving employment, housing programs and welfare benefits for French citizens. The share of respondents with high scores on the ethnocentrism scale ranged from 15 percent among those who placed themselves at the extreme left of the Left-Right spectrum, to 77 percent at the extreme right (figure 2). It was even higher among those who voted for Marine Le Pen, the leader of the Front National, in the 2012 presidential election. 83 percent of them were high scorers, versus

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
16) Pew survey in the same EU countries. See : <http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-fear-wave-of-refugees-will-mean-more-terrorism-fewer-jobs/> (accessed October 27, 2016).

17) Because it teaches critical thinking and introduces people to other countries and cultures, education is conducive to the rejection of stereotypes and helps fight prejudice. In the January 2016 Barometer on racism, the share of high scores on the ethnocentrism scale ranged from 15 among respondents who attended university for at least two years, to 51 percent among those without a “baccalauréat” (high school diploma), and the respective shares of those who agreed that there are too many immigrants in France were 31 and 71 percent.

18) Confirmed by a logistic regression predicting the share of high scores on the ethnocentrism scale and controlling for the impact of political orientation by age, gender, education, religious denomination and practice (Mayer et al., 2016, 303).

10 percent at the other end of the political spectrum, that is, those who voted for the Front de Gauche candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon. And the share of high scores reached a record 86 percent among those who declared the FN as the party they felt closest to, compared to 10 percent among Front de Gauche sympathizers and 8.5 among EELV (Europe Ecologie les Verts/Europe Ecology - The Greens) environmentalists.

Figure 2. Anti-immigrant sentiment by position on left-right scale in 2016 (%)



Anti-refugee sentiment follows the same pattern. Acceptance of refugees is negatively correlated with scores on the ethnocentrism scale, and like these scores, it reflects education levels and political orientations (Mayer, Michelat, Tiberj, Vitale 2016, 359). In January 2016, the share of respondents considering it a duty to accept refugees ranged from 12 percent among respondents who placed themselves at the extreme right, to 68 percent at the extreme left, and from 4 percent among Front National sympathizers to 75 percent among the non-socialist Left (environmentalists, extreme left, communists).

### 3.2. The impact of anti-immigrant attitudes on votes

If one looks at the problem the other way around, anti-immigrant and anti-refugee attitudes do not automatically give rise to anti-immigrant votes and, more

specifically, to support for the Front National. Each election is unique and takes place in a specific context. The voting decision depends on the candidates, campaign issues, and what the voter considers to be most important at the time. A recent survey shows that when French voters were asked what the most important issues would be for them in the upcoming presidential election of 2017<sup>19</sup>), they mentioned the fight against unemployment and economic recovery (63 percent said it would be “very important”) as a concern practically equal to the fight against terrorism (64 percent). The issue of migrants ranked much lower, in 5th position (50 percent answered “very important”), and “the integration of immigrants” came in 7th position (37 percent). Front National sympathizers were the exception. They alone viewed migrants as a leading issue, with 80 percent of them considering it “very important” – 30 percentage points above the sample’s average. Migrants were almost as important an issue for them as terrorism (83 percent, 19 points above the sample’s average). FN sympathizers were also much more concerned about the integration of immigrants (55 versus 37 percent).


In the first and second rounds of the 2015 regional elections, the probability of voting for the Front National increased with the intensity of the feeling that “there are too many immigrants in France”, ranging from 2 percent among respondents who did not agree with the idea at all, to 62 percent among those who “very strongly” agreed<sup>20</sup>). Conversely, at the other end of the political spectrum, the share of voters supporting the Left (environmentalist, socialist, Left Front and extreme left supporters combined) ranged from 10 percent among respondents who strongly agreed that the number of immigrants was excessive, to 81 percent among those strongly rejecting such a statement (figure 3). The vote for the moderate right followed a different pattern, peaking among voters who only “somewhat agreed” with the statement.

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19) Ifop survey for a group of local newspapers (Midi Libre, La Dépêche, L’Indépendant, Centre Presse Aveyron, La Nouvelle République des Pyrénées et Le Petit Bleu): [http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3504-1-study\\_file.pdf](http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/3504-1-study_file.pdf) (accessed October 27, 2016).

20) In the second round, which saw an intense anti FN mobilization, the shares varied from 2 to 56 percent.

Figure 3. Votes in 1st round of 2015 regional elections (%)



This Left-versus-extreme-right polarization is confirmed by a series of logistic regressions modeling the vote in the first round of the 2015 regional elections for the lists of the Front National, the Left and the Right, by ethnocentric and euro-skeptic attitudes, and controlling for age, gender, level of education, religious practice and position on the Left-Right scale<sup>21</sup>). The analysis shows that, all things being equal, ethnocentrism had a strong and statistically significant impact on support for the lists of the Front National on the one hand, and of the Left on the other, but not on support for the Right (table 4). Votes for the latter are better predicted by the degree of integration in the Catholic community, age (over 64 years old) and pro-European feelings.

21) Measures were designed to have a more robust indicator than a single question on the number of immigrants. The measure of ethnocentrism comprises three items: agreement with the idea there are too many immigrants in France today; disagreement with the ideas that immigrants enrich the country's cultural life and that French Muslim are as French as any other. The scale of euro-skepticism comprises five items: feeling that France did not benefit from the European Union, fear that the construction of Europe leads to less social protection /more unemployment/the loss of our identity/ an increase in the number of immigrants.

**Table 4. Logistic regression on votes in 2015 by sociodemographic and political variables**

	Lists Front National	Lists of the Left	Lists of the Right
	B(ES)	B(ES)	B(ES)
<b>Gender</b>			
Men	0.57(0.19)**	-0.40(0.16)*	-0.03(0.14)
Women			
<b>Age</b>			
18-24	0.80(0.50)	0.13(0.39)	-0.57(0.33)
25-34	1.63(0.38)***	-0.21(0.32)	-0.88(0.28)**
35-49	1.25(0.26)***	-0.50(0.24)*	-0.36(0.19)
50-64	0.83(0.25)***	0.00(0.22)	-0.57(0.28)**
65+			
<b>Level of education</b>			
University	-0.29(0.40)	-0.31(0.33)	0.25(0.28)
Bac, +2	-0.44(0.41)	-0.59(0.34)	0.48(0.28)
Secondary vocational	0.04(0.38)	-0.55(0.34)	0.35(0.29)
Secondary general	0.32(0.35)	-0.25(0.32)	-0.11(0.27)
None, primary school			
<b>Religion</b>			
Regularly Practicing Catholic	-0.55(0.38)	-0.84(0.33)*	1.04(0.26)****
Irregularly Practicing Catholic	-0.41(0.28)	-0.65(0.24)**	0.97(0.20)***
Non practicing Catholic	-0.24(0.34)	-0.36(0.31)	0.71(0.18)***
Other religion	-0.72(0.45)	0.447(0.36)	0.08(0.32)
No religion			
Score left-right scale (0-10)	0.26 (0.04)***	-0.71(0.05)***	0.39(0.04)***
Scale anti-EU sentiment	0.65 (0.08)***	-0.08(0.06)	-0.22(0.05)***
Scale ethnocentrism	0.87 (0.11)***	-0.90(0.11)***	0.02(0.08)
<b>Constante</b>	-7.093(0.57)***	5.629(0.46)***	-2.740(0.34)***
N	1178	1178	1178
Log Likelihood	739,790	912,858	1237,652
X2 (df)	448,524(16)	716,269(16)	249,673(16)
R2	0.50	0.61	0.27

Note: \*p<0,05; \*\*p<0,010; \*\*\*p<0,001 Data : French Regional Elections Survey 2015, unweighted.

Even if it does not rank first among voter concerns, the immigration issue clearly polarizes the French political scene, bringing together all the supporters of the Left against the Far Right(on the changing respective importance of economic and identity issues in France see Tiberj, 2012). The issue should weigh heavily in the 2017 presidential election.

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## | 국문요약 |

이 글은 프랑스의 이민과 정치 연계를 탐구하고 있다. 프랑스는 과거 북부와 남부 사하라 아프리카 지역에 대한 식민지 경영으로 많은 수의 무슬림이 살고 있으며, 오랜 이민 역사를 가지고 있다. 한편으로 인종중심주의와 인종주의에 대한 연구, 또 다른 한편으로 급진 우파에 대한 지지를 연계해 살펴본 결과는 프랑스 내에 반이민, 반무슬림 정서가 존재한다면 그것은 국민전선의 지지자를 제외하고는 첫 번째 투표 동기가 아니라는 점을 보여준다. 그러나 반이민, 반무슬림 이슈는 관용적인 좌파와 불관용을 주창하는 극우가 대립하면서 정치적 논쟁을 양극단으로 치닫게 하고 있다. 짧은 도입부에서는 여타 유럽국가들과 비교의 관점에서 프랑스의 이민전개, 난민과 망명자의 최신 유입 등을 살핀다. 두 번째 부분에서는 매년 진행되는 국가인권자문위원회(CNCDH)의 인종주의, 반유대주의, 외국인 혐오에 대한 조사에 기초하여 이민자와 난민에 대한 인식을 살펴본다. 마지막으로 국민전선에 의한 반이민, 반무슬림 정서의 정치화와 그것의 선거 영향을 분석한다.

〈주제어〉 프랑스 이민, 난민, 반이민, 반무슬림, 국민전선